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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
LEO M. BERTAGNOLE, INC. a 
corporation; BERTAGNOLE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP (Substituted), 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Case No. 16900 
vs. 
PINE MEADOW RANCHES , a 
corporation , et al . , 
Defendants-
Respondents . 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed its action to quiet title to Section 35, Township 1 North, 
Range 4 East, in Summit County, Utah. The defendants counterclaimed and alleged 
that a road up Tollgate Canyon had continually existed from as early as 1915 to the 
present date (over 60 years) and that the Tollgate Canyon road was deemed to be a 
public highway pursuant to Section 27-12-89, U .C .A., 1953, which provides as 
follows: 
Public use constituting dedication. --A highway shall be 
deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public when it has been continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of 10 years . 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. , District Judge, tried the 
case without a jury and made several visits to the premises (Tr .18) . He found 
by his Memorandum Decision (R .178) "That for many years, prior to the commen 
ment of the action by plaintiff there was a continuous uninterrupted use of the ro 
way across the plaintiff's land and up Tollgate Canyon west of the State Highway 
and alongside the creek , and as shown in the exhibit aerial photographs . 
(Tr .178). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The U. S . G. S . map (Exhibit 2) prepared from aerial photographs 
taken in 1963 shows that Interstate Highway 80 goes down Silver Creek Canyon 
into Wanship and at the mouth of Tollgate Canyon , in Section 35 , there is an ov 
pass structure with on-ramps and off-ramps. The only place this freeway exit 
leads to is the road up Tollgate Canyon and the private right-of-way lines for the 
telephone company and the gas company. Plaintiff's ownership of Section 35 is 
subject to the right-of-way for I-80, the old railroad right-of-way and a 100-fool 
stock right-of-way on the west side of the freeway (Tr .14). The plaintiff's exp 
witness Jay R. Bingham testified that it is 850 feet from the center of the overpas 
structure to the west line of Section 35 (Tr. 201) or 470 feet from the west bound· 
ary of the stock trail to the west line of Section 35 (Tr .192). Plaintiff seeks to 
close this 4 70 feet of road, or deny access from the freeway to anyone using the 
Tollgate Canyon Road. The U .S .G .S. map shows that this road serves as the 
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only means of access to an area of 15 to 20 square miles. There is no passable 
road up Alexander Canyon. A rough road was built up Alexander Canyon in the 
1950's (Tr.59), but it washed out (Tr.63). 
Prior to his death in August, 1975 (Tr .29), Fay Bates had his 
deposition taken. He testified that he was born in Wanship in 1909 and that his 
father ran sheep at the head of Tollgate Canyon as early as he could remember. 
Their summer range for 2 ,000 to 3 ,000 sheep was the Silver Creek slope of 
Silver Creek Canyon (Dep . 7) . He testified that, historically it is pretty well 
established that, the original Silver Creek Road from Wanship westerly was built 
by private contract and the contractor had the prerogative of setting up a toll 
station to collect tolls from people who used the road. The tolls were collected 
at the mouth of Tollgate Canyon (Dep .11) . In 1915 he rode up the Tollgate Can-
yon road on the back of his father's saddle horse. The Tollgate Road was a wagon 
road and used as a she~p camp road every summer (Dep .13) . There was never 
any fence along the old highway 30 or along the west line of Section 35 from 1915 
until the stock trail fence was put up by the State Road Commission sometime after 
1963 (Dep. 22; Tr.32,52,70,93). 
Fay's father sold out of the sheep business between 1915 and 1920 
(Dep .14), but Fay reacquired land and inherited some from his mother to get 
back into the sheep business in this same area in 1934 (Dep .16). During these 
intervening years, the Bitners ran their sheep on this Silver Creek slope and 
they did considerable work on the road to get equipment up and down there 
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(Tr. 51) . Fay and his brother, John Bates, used the road every summer to tr' 
sheep, haul a sheep camp and supplies with a truck and a jeep (Dep .23). 
Fay Bates testified that Bertagnole ran sheep on the east side of 
Silver Creek Canyon and he ran his sheep on the west side of Silver Creek. 
bottom of the canyon was used as the dividing line for grazing purposes (Dep. 
28 ,29). Due to this type of use of the land for grazing purposes, no one ever 
challenged anyone's right to go up or down the Tollgate Canyon Road (Dep.23) 
While Highway 30 was still in place, the telphone company used the Tollgate 
Canyon Road to take big, heavy equipment for purposes of burying its telepho 
line which ran through Section 35 (see U . S . G . S . map , Exh. 2 , Dep. 26) . The 
gas company did the same thing when they buried a gas line sometime prior to 
1949 (Dep. 26). Fay Bates did some caterpillar work to improve the road furth 
up the canyon on his own property (Dep .24). The road was travelled by anyo 
who felt they wanted to go in there ... "I do know there was multitudinous de 
hunters in there and we tried at times to control it , to some extent , I mean, but 
of course, at a place like that it is impossible for me , even if I tried, to control 
it, or anybody did, to prevent them from going in there (Dep. 27) . In the 1m 
there were fellows from Spanish Fork who had cabins up by some fishing ponds 
in Sections 9 and 10, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, and at times in the sum 
there would be picnickers and people fishing (Dep. 32, 33; Tr. 33) . The cabins 
Sections 9 and 10 show on the map, Exh. 2. The use of the road was generally 
confined to the summer months, early May to late October. In later years snow 
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mobiles drove up and down the canyon for purposes of recreation (Tr. 90). The 
road was wide enough for pickup trucks to pass in wide places (Dep. 40; Tr .113). 
Mae Bates testified that from 1938 to 1958 she went up there with her 
husband, Fay Bates, regularly every year (Tr. 30-32); that there was never any 
fences or gates and that there were people that went up there hunting and fishing, 
meaning the local people from Wanship (Tr. 33). There were four aerial photo-
graphs introduced into evidence by the plaintiff which were dated in 1952, 1962, 
1967 and 1978. The aerial photographs clearly show a well-marked travelled 
road for this 26-year period and for 22 years prior to plaintiffs filing their Com-
plaint. The Trial Court specifically mentioned in his Memorandum Decision (R . 
. . 
178) that the road was shown in the aerial photographs. Mae Bates in the 1950' s 
saw people fishing up near the beaver bonds and later Derral Christensen in the 
hunting season of 1967 or 1968 saw 40-50 vehicles containing deer hunters up 
above the mouth of Tollgate Canyon (Tr.93). 
Plaintiffs' examination of the witnesses tried to describe the road 
as going on the left hand side of the creek and up the pipeline road shown on 
the U.S. G. S .. map, but all of defendants' witnesses clearly described the road 
taking off from old Highway 30 and going up the right hand side of the creek 
(Tr.57 ,95). The aerial photographs clearly identify this location. Derral 
Christensen and Reed Robison bought the Bates property from Fay Bates in 1965 
(Tr. 95) and they sold it to Brent Jensen for mountain subdivision development 
in 1970 (Tr .105). By that time the road was passable by a car, better than a 
two-rut road , and each year a certain amount of grading of bar ditches and things 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
of this type were done (Tr .106). Mr. Jensen had been up and down the road 
thousands of times (Tr .107). Four stakes of the LDS Church bought land in Se 
tion 15 for a church recreation area (Tr .131; Exh. 4) and in 1977 American Oil 
Company drilled an oil well in Section 15 called the Brinkerhoff site , which was 
7-1/2 miles from the freeway to Section 15, and they did considerable improve-
ment on the road (Tr. 71, 106, 107, 116) . The road finally terminates at a KUED 
television transmitter station on Lewis Peak (Tr .150) . 
Brent Jensen bought the property in 1970 (Tr. 105) and he cut 
in 48 to 49 miles of mountain road prior to plaintiff's Complaint being filed in 
Summit County. These roads are in the North half of Section 28, 200 acres in 
Section 27, all of Section 22, the East 1/2 of Section 20, all of Section 21, 80 acr 
in Section 17 and the North half of Section 16 (Tr .118) . 
At the time of trial there were about 120 cabins that were built in 
the Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch subdivisions (Tr. 125) . Ther 
were approximately 380 sales of subdivision lots which occurred prior to Janu-
ary 1; 1975 ( 495 - 115 = 380) (Tr .146, 147) . The defendants answered the plain 
tiffs' Interrogatories (R .101-104 and R .114-126) furnishing plaintiff with the 
names of over 253 persons known to the defendants who own property with 
access which is by use of the Tollgate road over said Section 35 . The plaintiffs 
never amended their Complaint to include any of these persons as defendants 
who bought lots prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 
The actual date of filing of the lawsuit and compliance with the lis 
pendens statute is in dispute. ~laintiffs' Complaint was originally filed in~ 
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Lake County on August 12. 1974 (R. 07). It was not until January 17. 1975, 
that the Clerk of Salt Lake County was ordered by Judge Stew art M. Hanson, 
Jr. to transmit the file to Summit County (R. 03) . The Complaint was filed 
January 23, 1975, in Summit County (R. 07) . Therefore, the record clearly 
shows that at least 380 sales of subdivision lots occurred prior to filing the Com-
plaint in Summit County, and that these names were furnished to plaintiffs in 
Jensen's Answers to Interrogatories, which persons were not joined as parties 
to the action . 
The lis pendens statute provides: 
78-40-2. Lis pendens .--In any action affecting the 
title to, or the right of possession of, real property 
the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or 
thereafter, and the defendant at the time of filing 
his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in 
such answer, or at any time afterward, may file 
for record with the recorder of the county in which 
the property or some part thereof is situated a notice 
of the pendency of the action , containing the names 
of the parties , the object of the action or defense , 
and a description of the property in that county 
affected thereby . From the time of filing such notice 
for record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer 
of the property affected thereby be deemed to have 
constructive notice of the pendency of the action , 
and only of its pendency against parties designated 
by their real names . [Emphasis added. ] 
Plaintiffs' lis pendens was recorded in Summit County August 19, 1974 (captioned 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County) but stating that "the above quiet title 
action is pending in the above entitled court for the purpose of quieting title 
to the real property located in Summit County , State of Utah" . . . describing 
Section 35, Township 1 North, Range 4 East (R.221,222). Where the object of 
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the action was to close the 470 feet of Tollgate road denying access to (finally) 
800 or 900 landowners (Tr .130) and 15 square miles of land on the Silver CreeK 
slope (Exh .2) the lis pendens should have been much more specific and should 
have stated that the property in that county affected thereby included all of 
the land in Township 1 North Ranges 4 and 5 East "which used the Tollgate Can 
yon road as a means of ingress and egress . " Plaintiff never sought any preli · 
injunction nor restraining order to keep the road closed , or notify the purchase 
of subdivision lots of the object of the action from January 23, 1975 (date of 
filing its Complaint in Summit County) to the date of trial on November 13, 19n 
Plaintiff procrastinated for nearly five years in bringing the case to trial. 
After the lawsuit was commenced a chicken wire gate was put upfu 
the most westerly stock trail fence (470 feet east of plaintiffs' Section 35 West 
boundary) (Tr .123) but the gate was seen by Brent Jensen lying along side of 
the fence all bent to pieces (Tr .124) . There "was some six hundred landowner 
up in that area. So who felt deprived because the gate was across the only road 
they could get to their canyon " . . . did it . " I don't know . I definitely did not 
(Tr .124). 
The trial court was convinced, after a view of the road by clear and 
convincing evidence (Tr .178), that there was a continuous uninterrupted use of 
the roadway across the plaintiffs' land and up Tollgate Canyon. It was not dis· 
puted that there was a road there from 1915 to present date; that the plaintiffs 
never maintained a fence or gate to prevent use of the road by the public until 
after the freeway was built, and after the state fenced the stock trail. The trial 
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court believed the defendants' witnesses that multitudinous deer hunters, 
fishermen, lovers (Dep. 56) , picnickers and campers went up the road in the 
bottom of Tollgate Canyon each summer. John Bates testified that there were 
improvements made from 1933 to 1958; that these improvements were made by 
him and his brothers, and they were made by the Bitners who owned the pro-
perty previously (Tr. 58) . It was obviously such an old Wasatch mountain road 
that there was no witness who testified he was shut out or couldn't use it, or 
that no improvements had been made. All that has to be shown under the statute, 
Section 27-12-89 is that "it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare 
for a period of 10 years . " 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE AND LAW CLEARLY SUSTAIN THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
The most important fundamental fact in this case is that canyons 
in the Wasatch Mountains , such as Silver Creek Canyon, Parley's Canyon, East 
Canyon, Emigration Canyon and Tollgate Canyon are the only natural courses for 
roads to follow. This Court, the same as the trial court, knows that roads as a 
means of access into large mountainous areas depart from a main canyon up the 
various tributary canyons . The necessity of roads is recognized in both federal 
and state statutes: The Utah Supreme Court explained in Lindsay Land & Live 
Stock Co. vs. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 275 Pac. 646: 
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By Act of Congress passed in 1866, Revised Statutes 
U.S. §2477 (43 USCA §932) it was provided: 
The right of way for the construction of 
highways over public lands, not reserved for 
public uses , is hereby granted. 
"By this act" said the court in Streeter 
vs. Stalnaker, 61 Neb. 205, 85 N. W. 47, 48, 
"the government consented that any of its lands 
not reserved for a public purpose might be taken 
and used for public roads. The statute was a 
standing offer for a free right of way over the pub-
lic domain, and as soon as it was accepted in an 
appropriate manner by the agents of the public, 
or the public itself a highway was established." 
It has been held by numerous courts that the grant 
may be accepted by public use without formal action by 
public auth9rities, antj. that continued use of the road by 
the public for such length of time and under such circum-
stances as to clearly indicate an intention on the part of 
the public to accept the grant is sufficient. 
In Jeremy vs. Bertagnole (Summit County), 101Utah1, 116 P.2d 
420, E .J. Jeremy sued for trespass against Angel Bertagnole and denied that 
any public road existed down East Canyon from U.S. 30S on the North to its 
junction with U.S. 40-530 on the South. From an adverse decree Jeremy appeal 
but the Supreme Court affirmed. The case demonstrates that it requires no high 
degree of proof to show that a roadway or trail existed; that the doctrines of 
dedication as a public road under the ten-year statute and prescription for more 
than twenty years' continuous use are practically synonomous where the eviden 
shows an old road (more than 20 years) gradually becoming improved. The cou 
quoted from Lindsay Land & Live Stock vs. Churnos, supra, that "It was prop 
and necessary for the court in defining the road to determine its width and to fiI 
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the same according to what was reasonable and necessary under all the facts and 
circumstances for the uses which were made of the road" (101 Utah, Page 8) * * * 
"the implied dedication of a roadway to automobile traffic is the dedication of a 
roadway of sufficient width for safe and convenient use thereof by such traffic." 
(101 Utah, Page 9) 
Testimony of the other witnesses was to the effect 
that at various times they drove sheep and cattle along the 
trail. Such testimony covers a period from the 1870' s to the 
time of trial. True , such testimony does not reveal that any 
witness used the road at weekly , monthly, or even yearly 
intervals over a period of ten years but from the evidence 
adduced the inference is clearly a reasonable one that the 
road was used for the driving of cattle and sheep for a 
number of years in excess of that required, whenever it 
was necessary or convenient for the members of the public 
who were engaged in raising or herding stock to so use it. 
(101 Utah at page 10) 
A 1958 case from Summit County is that of Boyer vs. Clark, 7 Utah 
2d 395, 326 P. 2d 107. The road in question was a "wagon trail which runs in a 
northerly direction up Middle Canyon and over the ridge into Grass Creek from 
the State Highway 133 which goes easterly up Chalk Creek from Coalville to Upton, 
Utah , and beyond. " The District Court found that no public road existed , but a 
unanimous Supreme Court reversed as a matter of law . In that case like the present 
one, there was heavy use of the road during deer hunting season and no one 
testified that permission was asked or obtained from any owner to traverse the 
trail (7 Utah 2d at 39 7) • 
The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case 
disclosed that for a period exceeding 50 years, the 
public, even though not consisting of a great many 
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use 
of Middle Canyon Road in traveling by wagon and 
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other vehicles and by horse from Upton to Grass Creek 
and various other points to and from Highway 133. 
This road up Middle Canyon , the same as the East Canyon road, 
was never snowplowed in the wintertime. Plaintiffs' counsel cross-examined 
several witnesses who admitted they did not travel up Tollgate Canyon in the 
winter months, but in the early 1960's the witnesses Derral Christensen., Reed 
Robison and Brent Jensen all went up the Tollgate Canyon road via snowmobile, 
There is no Utah law that a road which has a long number of years' summer use 
does not become a public road because it is snowbound during the winter. 
The short distance which the old road might have varied at the 
mouth of Tollgate Creek due to the construction of the on and of~ ramps for the 
Interstate overpass built at this junction fits the language of the Supreme Court' 
Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. vs. Churnos, supra, where the Court made th 
following observation: 
There was evidence that the travel over the road did 
not always follow an identical or uniform line, but at 
all times and in a few places varied somewhat therefrom 
and that sheep when trailing across would sometimes 
depart from the line of the road. There was ample 
positive evidence, however, that the road as described 
by the findings and decree was substantially the line and 
course of the road as it had been traveled and used for 
more than fifty years . 
* * * 
And at all times it was used as a general way for the 
driving or trailing of sheep. This latter use was not by 
a few persons, but by many persons, and it involved 
more than the mere driving of animals on the road. Camp 
outfits and supplies accompanied the herds and were 
moved over the road in camp wagons and on pack horses. 
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While it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure 
what is a public use or a public thoroughfare. it can be 
said here that the road was used by many and different 
persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all 
who desired to use it; that the use made of it was as 
general and extensive as the situation and surroundings 
would permit, had the road been formally laid out as a 
public highway by public authority. We therefore con-
clude that the court was justified in finding that the road 
had been continuously and uninterruptedly used as a 
public thoroughfare for more than ten years . 
With respect to the certainty of the line or course 
of the road, the evidence was also sufficient to support 
the decree. While the public cannot acquire a right by 
use to pass over a tract of land generally , but only in a 
certain line or way, it is not indispensable to the 
acquisition of the right that there should be no devia-
tion in the use from a direct line of travel . If the 
travel has remained substantially unchanged, and the 
practical identicy of the road preserved, it is sufficient, 
although there may have been slight deviations from the 
common way to avoid encroachments, obstacles, or 
obstructions upon the road. [Emphasis added] (75 Utah 
at Page 392) 
It is obvious that the road up or down Tollgate Canyon intersected Silver Creek 
Canyon onto U.S. Highway 30 and then in about 1961 it connected onto Interstate 
80 . It does not make any legal difference on which side of the creek the first 
Tollgate road existed. It was a road up Tollgate Canyon departing out of Silver 
Creek Canyon. It is exactly the same situation as the Middle Canyon Road 
departing from Chalk Creek as discussed in Boyer vs. Clark, supra. 
All of the aerial photographs, Exhibits P-16 (1952), P-17 (1962), 
P-18 (1967) and P-19 (1978) clearly show the existence of the Tollgate road 
going up the right hand side of the creek. 
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POINT II 
THE STATUTE 27-12-89 REQUIRES THAT "A HIGHWAY SHALL 
BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DEDICATED AND ABANDONED 
TO THE USE OF THE PUBLIC . . . " 
Plaintiffs-appellants complain of the Trial Court's decision to make 
highway 30 feet wide instead of 12 or 13 feet wide. The basis of this argument' 
that Mr. Skeen asked the witness to describe the width of the road and the Cou 
asked how wide was the travelled portion of the road and the witness answered1 
"Oh, the wearing surface of the road I would say would probably be maybe 12 f 
wide, 13 feet wide (Tr .113). There was also evidence that 2 ,000 sheep had be 
driven up Tollgate Canyon every summer for more than ten years . Heavy equi 
. . 
ment (meaning cats , dozers , semi-trailers and large trucks) belonging to the 
telephone company, the gas company and to AMOCO had used the road. A high 
needs bar ditches for drainage, cuts and banks to support it, culver!s where it 
crosses a creek, and it needs to be wide enough to be safe. Plaintiffs act as th 
they would build a chain link fence or build a concrete wall on each side of the 
13-foot "highway". The argument is silly. You don't need to drive a vehicle 
30 feet wide, or have a "wearing surface" (area smoothed down by the tires on 
dirt or gravelled road) 30 feet wide in order to have a highway deemed to have 
been dedicated or abandoned to the use of the public pursuant to the statute. T 
Supreme Court or one of its clerks could stop off the Interstate Freeway at this 
Silver Creek junction exit, and check out in five minutes the fact that thirty feel 
is a reasonable width for the highway across this first 470 feet to a 7-1/2 mile 
mountain road. 
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When Derral Christensen and Reed Robison sold the top mountain 
acreage to Brent Jensen, they granted and reserved a 66-foot right-of-way for 
road purposes over all their land in Sections 34, 33, 28, 27, 22 , 21. 20, 16 and 
15 over which prior mountain roads or jeep roads existed (Tr .100). 
In Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. vs. Churnos, et al. , supra, a 
road existed for driving of sheep and hauling sheep camps , supplies and vehicles 
through a narrow canyon or pass called Davenport Canyon in southern Cache 
County. The eastern terminus of the road is a large area of mountain land valuable 
for grazing animals in the summer season. The facts are very similar to the pre-
sent case. The Supreme Court said: 
. . 
Under all of the evidence the court was justified in fixing 
the width of the road at one hundred feet. · 
In Jeremy vs. Bertagnole, supra, the Supreme Court affirmed a 
judgment which fixed the width of the first small fenced portion of the road at 
sixty feet and at five rods (82. 5 feet) for the remaining portion. This road ran 
down East Canyon in Summit and Morgan Counties. 
In Sullivan vs. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 Pac. 954, the Supreme 
Court affirmed a judgment establishing a mountain road in White Pine Canyon, 
Summit County, which was three rods wide (49 .5 feet). 
The trial court made its own visit to the road in question and changed 
the suggested 50 feet as set forth in defendants' Findings of Fact to 30 feet (R. 203). 
This is a very modest width. In places where the road is cut along the steep creek 
banks of Tollgate Canyon the width of the road plus the cut and fill for banks 
amounts to more than 50 feet. 
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In conclusion, it should be noted that plaintiff-appellant has 
refrained from citing any of the mountain road cases such as Lindsay Land & 
Live Stock vs. Churnos, Sullivan vs. Condas, Jeremy vs. Bertagnole and 
Boyer vs. Clark. It is apparent that more stringent evidentiary tests have be 
applied by the Supreme Court in the valley, short distance road cases such as 
Bonner vs. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P. 2d 646 (dead end street called 
McClelland Street in Salt Lake City) and Peterson vs. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 
438 P. 2d 545. As soon as the public picnicker, deer hunter, fisherman and joy 
rider goes into the mountains , they will drive up and down every canyon that 
has an old sheep camp or truck road which is not closed by fence or posted. 
This is especially true of Tollgate Canyon which is the fourth exit with an on-
ramp and off-ramp east of Salt Lake City on Interstate 80. None of the plaintiffs 
or their predecessors in title made any effort to stop public travel until the year 
" before the Complaint was filed in 1975. The state fenced its stock right-of-way 
in 1964, or thereabouts, but there was no testimony that any travelers thereaft 
opened or closed any gate. It was always left open. The gate was seen bent an 
mangled lying to the side of the road (Tr .124) . This Tollgate Canyon which 
crosses only 470 feet of plaintiff's property from the west line of Section 35 to th 
fence on the stock right-of-way extends 7-1/2 miles. It serves 15 to 20 square 
miles of land that would otherwise have no right of ingress and egress to the 
Interstate Highway. County governments in Utah have taken extremely little 
initiative in condemning mountain roads for the sake of saving costs of acquisiti 
and expenses of maintenance , etc. 
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To permit the natural development of thousands of acres of mountain, 
privately owned lands and public access to vast areas of summer recreation, the 
Court should interpret the statute in the spirit in which it was written: "A 
highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period 
of ten years." The following statutory section states that "All p'ublic highways 
once established shall continue to be highways until abandoned or vacated by 
order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction over any such highway, or 
by other competent authority." See Sullivan vs. Condas, 76 Utah at page 594. 
The Tollgate Road was a public thoroughfare for over 50 years prior to plaintiff 
asserting any right to stop public travel. It could not be abandoned as a highway 
by private individuals . In these type of cases the burden should be on the owner 
of the serviertt estate to fence or block the road, or to stop all public travel. 
The Jud~~ent should be affirmed. 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
By R. fl. )tJ~ 
Richard H. Nebeker 
Attorney for Defendants- Respondents 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents were 
mailed to R. C . Skeen and E .J . Skeen of Skeen & Skeen, attorneys for plaintiffs~ 
appellants, 536 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this ~ 'I day of 
August, 1980. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
